Reference ID | Subject | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
BRITISH AMBASSADOR LAUDS OMANI ROLE IN IRAN’S | |||||
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S MEETING WITH SULTAN | |||||
OMAN REMAINS WARY OF IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM | |||||
OMANI GOVERNMENT REACTS STRONGLY TO SUGGESTION OF PATRIOT |
This is the timed schedule of leaked cables from US embassy in Muscat Oman.
VZCZCXRO1333
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMS #0359 1011257
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111257Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8079
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
Wednesday, 11 April 2007, 12:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000359
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS PREL, IR, MU
SUBJECT: BRITISH AMBASSADOR LAUDS OMANI ROLE IN IRAN’S
RELEASE OF CAPTIVE SAILORS
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) During a May 11 meeting with the Ambassador, British Ambassador Noel Guckian expressed great satisfaction with Oman’s efforts to facilitate the release of the 15 members of the British Royal Navy seized by Iranian forces on March 23. Guckian stated that he had been in near daily contact with Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi during the crisis, and that bin Alawi had been “very supportive.†According to Guckian, bin Alawi called Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, “a number of times†to urge the immediate release of the captive sailors.
2. (C) Guckian also confirmed that he received a phone call from bin Alawi on April 4 in the early afternoon informing him that Iranian President Ahmadinejad would shortly be making a public announcement which would be “very favorable.†Bin Alawi had apparently just received the news himself from Larijani. (Note: Guckian was at the Ambassador’s residence for a business lunch when bin Alawi called him. End note.)
3. (C) The UK Ambassador reiterated that the Omanis had been very supportive throughout the crisis and even credited them in some part for the successful outcome. It was an occasion, he concluded, when Oman’s “positive but non-substantive†relationship with Tehran actually proved useful to the Omanis and an important Omani ally. GRAPPO
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SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S MEETING WITH SULTAN QABOOS Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) SUMMARY 1. (C) Sultan Qaboos discussed both domestic and regional issues during his February 19 meeting with Admiral William J. Fallon, CENTCOM Commander. On the domestic front, the Sultan described his desire to empower the government to be more responsive to citizen concerns. Seeking to strengthen the role of Omani women, the Sultan plans to convene a conference in 2009 designed to increase the participation and leadership of women in all aspects of Omani society. Sultan Qaboos also shared plans for continued infrastructure development in Oman and described efforts underway to obtain more natural gas. On Iraq, the Sultan advised against a premature withdrawal of U.S. forces and stated that more regional assistance would be forthcoming if Iraqis would "come together" to take charge of, and invest in, their own country. Sultan Qaboos shared U.S. concerns about Iranian meddling in Iraq and elsewhere, but contended that Tehran knew confrontation with the U.S. was not in its interest. Iran's "charm offensive" in the GCC had succeeded in lessening suspicions of some officials about the true intentions of Iranian policies. End Summary. 2. (C) CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, accompanied by the Ambassador, met February 19 with Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id for approximately 2 hours at one of the Sultan's castles -- Husn al Shumugh -- in the interior of Oman. (Note: The Sultan was outside of Muscat on his annual 4-6 week "meet the people tour" during which he visits selected sites outside the capital. End Note.) The Sultan appeared in good health and was cheerful, although he commented that his role as ruler of Oman was demanding and did not allow him time to do all the things he wanted to do, such as reading more books. "My office is wherever I am," he stated, noting that he constantly had to attend to paperwork and urgent requests from his staff, among other tasks. The Sultan added that despite his busy schedule, he always made time to "watch the news," though he did not elaborate on his preferred media outlet. CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ 3. (C) The Sultan expressed concern over a premature withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Recognizing recent improvements in the security situation, he counseled that American troops should only leave "when the time is right." He stressed that Iraqis had to "take charge" of the fate of their country, but questioned whether the different factions would be able to "come together" to accomplish this. He pointedly asked the Admiral, "Do you really think Prime Minister Maliki and his government are capable of pulling the country together?" The Sultan did not directly respond to Admiral Fallon's comment on the need for assistance and investment for Iraq from elsewhere in the region. Instead, he stated that if the Iraqi people helped themselves and invested in their own country, others would follow suit. 4. (C) The Sultan appeared to follow events in Iraq closely. He commented, for example, that the Kurds had apparently "come out well" in recent central government talks on budget issues, and asked about the status of electricity production in Iraq. The Sultan seemed to take a particular interest in Admiral Fallon's discussion of Iraqi Shia leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, including the status of Hakim's health and his possible successors. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 5. (C) In addition to emphasizing the need for outside investment in Iraq, Admiral Fallon highlighted the importance of assistance from regional states for infrastructure development in Afghanistan and other Central Asian nations. Again the Sultan sidestepped the issue and shifted the conversation to the critical role of roads and highways in economic development. He then mentioned infrastructure projects for Oman currently under consideration, including construction of a new dam and a freight rail line from the northern port of Sohar to the planned port in Duqm. The Sultan hoped that the southern port of Salalah could be linked by rail to Muscat and, eventually, to other GCC states. MUSCAT 00000174 002 OF 003 IRANIAN ISSUES 6. (C) The Sultan commented that the Iranians are "not fools," and claimed that Tehran realized there are "certain lines it cannot cross" (i.e., direct confrontation with the U.S.). Regarding GCC relations with the Iranian government, he stated, "Iran is a big country with muscles and we must deal with it." He continued that Iran's "charm offensive" in
the region had achieved a degree of success as some GCC authorities (he did not mention names) were now less suspicious of Iranian intentions. The Sultan added, laughing, that "I must say that as long as (the U.S.) is on the horizon, we have nothing to fear." 7. (C) Responding to Admiral Fallon's frustration with Iranian interference in Iraq, the Sultan remarked that Iranian meddling abroad was "almost a game" to the regime in Tehran, and said that Iran's leaders would have to stop this practice if Iran wanted to "join the world as a noble country." The Sultan hoped that Iraqi leaders would clearly tell and convince Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his upcoming visit to Iraq to cease Iran's unhelpful interference in their internal affairs. On the possibility that Iran is waiting out the President's final term before re-assessing its strategy, the Sultan said that Tehran should realize that it has to deal with the U.S. as a country, and not just the current administration. THE SEARCH FOR GAS 8. (C) After noting Iranian dependence on imports of refined fuel, the Sultan described Oman's efforts to obtain more natural gas to fuel growing domestic power needs and large-scale industrial projects. Oman had committed too much of its limited gas production to long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) export contracts. As a result, the government was trying to boost production by taking smaller and less productive gas fields away from Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) -- 60% owned by the government and 34% owned by Royal Dutch Shell -- and awarding them to outside companies such as British Gas and BP. The Sultan claimed these firms were in a better position to increase productivity in these fields, and pointed to the progress of U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Company in raising oil production in former PDO concession areas, such as Mukhaizna. 9. (C) Looking offshore, the Sultan said he hoped that new gas fields would be found in the Gulf of Oman to help ease the country's natural gas shortage. India's Reliance Industries was currently exploring a deepwater oil and gas block in this body of water, but had made no significant discoveries yet. Qatar would begin supplying gas to Oman by 2013, the Sultan noted, but not in quantities sufficient to meet outstanding needs. He added that Oman was still supplying limited gas from Musandam to Ras al-Khaimah in the UAE due to an agreement he made with its emir -- and which the Sultan felt he could not break -- well before Oman was squeezed for this resource. THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION 10. (C) Sultan Qaboos shared that he placed a great deal of importance on education, and noted that a study of history provided the context needed to better understand present trends and events. Regarding claims that some rulers in the region wanted to keep their people uneducated in order to more easily control them, the Sultan explained that this strategy could easily backfire as it also left the populace more susceptible to influence by extremists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Former Egyptian president and pan-Arabist leader Gamal Abdal Nasser, the Sultan said, had "set the region back" by being "anti-everything" and engaging in vitriolic rhetoric designed to keep the masses ignorant. EMPOWERING THE GOVERNMENT AND WOMEN 11. (C) On domestic politics, the Sultan announced that he would hold the first-ever combined meeting of his Cabinet of Ministers and the Majlis al-Shura (the directly elected lower MUSCAT 00000174 003 OF 003 house of Oman's bicameral advisory body) on February 26. By meeting together, the Sultan hoped that the Cabinet and the Majlis would learn how to cooperate better and jointly focus on important issues. He commented that both bodies also needed to "demonstrate more leadership" and avoid past foot-dragging on promises made to the populace. "People need to see the results of decisions," the Sultan stated. 12. (C) Letting Admiral Fallon and the Ambassador in on a "secret," the Sultan confided that he planned to call for a conference of all "notable women" in Oman in 2009 in a bid to encourage Omani women to expand their participation and leadership in different aspects of Omani society. Minister of Social Development, Dr. Sharifa bint Khalfan al-Yahyaiya (one of Oman's three female cabinet ministers) will chair the meeting on the Sultan's behalf. Lamenting that no women won seats in the October 2007 election for the Majlis al-Shura, Sultan Qaboos observed that Omani women were stuck in tradition and needed to be empowered to "take more charge" and to be "less shy." "Some customs (regarding women)," he added, "shouldn't be kept." Nevertheless, gradual change is occurring in Oman, the Sultan asserted. His philosophy was to "let it happen," rather than hold it up to public debate, as the latter course of action often led to factional fighting, internal strife, and other ills. A RECURRENT THEME: MORE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 13. (C) In concluding the meeting, Sultan Qaboos returned to his goal of improving the responsiveness of the Omani government to citizen concerns. He stated that he would be pressing "harder" on his ministers to engage in more and better public relations efforts before the Omani police and to effectively enforce their decisions so that the people could see the benefits of announced actions. Giving one particular example, the Sultan said that rather than simply announce a new development project, the government should explain the downstream employment opportunities the project would generate for Omani citizens. Effective cooperation between ministries and the Majlis Oman was also needed to strengthen the civil institutional framework in Oman, the Sultan added. COMMENT 14. (S/NF) In discussing his desire for operational change in the senior government ranks, the Sultan twice implied (but did not directly state) that such change was needed to prepare the country for his eventual departure from power. The Sultan's comments indicated that he may feel the government is too dependent on his authority and should be empowered to run more effectively without constant direction from the palace. End Comment. 15. (U) This message has been reviewed by Admiral Fallon. GRAPPOVZCZCXRO5264OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUKDE RUEHMS #0565/01 2200743ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 070743Z AUG 08FM AMEMBASSY MUSCATTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9835INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVERHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SCRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDCRHEFDIA/DIA WASHDCRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDCRHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLRHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENTS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000565 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2018 TAGS: PREL PARM IR MU
SUBJECT: OMAN REMAINS WARY OF IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D).
Summary 1. (S/NF) Minister of the Royal Office and head of the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Ali bin Majid al-Ma'amari, reviewed Oman's view on Iran from a security perspective, highlighting Omani awareness of Iran's deceptive tactics and expansionist ideological desires in the region. During an introductory meeting with NAVCENT commander VADM William Gortney, accompanied by the Ambassador, General Ali addressed the Iranian nuclear file, security in the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian interference in the region. Ali Majid's suspicious view of Iran stands in stark contrast to conciliatory if not obsequious public comments of Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 'Alawi regarding Iran and its role in the region. End summary. Won't Oppose Further Sanctions on Iran 2. (S/NF)Characterizing Oman's preference for "frankness and clarity," General Ali began his comments on Iran by noting the reality of Iran as a nearby neighbor, which influenced Oman's relations with Iran. Toward the end of the discussion, he compared Oman's normal relations with Iran to the relations of other GCC members with Iran. Throughout the meeting, he frequently touched on the theme of how different Oman was from other GCC member states, whose real intentions and positions often eluded Omani comprehension. 3. (S/NF) The Iranian nuclear issue stood at the forefront of the General's mind. He described the nuclear file as an international issue, noting that resolution of this issue should be dealt with through international bodies such as the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Oman would respect decisions of these groups and play its role in the international community. Oman would not oppose imposition of further measures against Iran by the international bodies; however, Oman did not want to play an active role in advocating for such measures itself. Iranian Intentions Clear: Stall for Time4. (S/NF) Ali Majid stated that Oman was aware of Iranian stall tactics in the talks over the nuclear issue. Instead of responding by the August 5 deadline, the Iranian side offered a new initiative for talks, confirming reports from the U.S. and others that Iran indeed is trying merely to buy time. Letting the 5 August deadline pass in responding positively to the P5 1 proposal made the Iranian intention to stall "very clear to Oman." The Ambassador noted that the U.S. has been working with allies around the world, and especially within the EU, to further restrict Iranian economic activity in an effort to influence Iran's position on the nuclear file. General Ali agreed that sanctions to date were having an impact on the Iranian economy, despite Iran's public denials. Moreover, he said, Iran believed the U.S. would never attack Iran, a belief that encouraged Iran to persist in its stall tactics. Nevertheless, he advocated a non-military solution as the best option for the U.S., and suggested that over the long term, establishment of U.S. relations at some level with the Iranian government might enable the U.S. to better influence the Iranian government and people. Empty Threats Against the Strait 5. (S/NF) Responding to the Ambassador's question about recent Iranian statements threatening the Strait of Hormuz, Ali Majid dismissed the threats as "empty words" and perhaps a feeble attempt to up its bargaining leverage vis a vis the P5 1. VADM Gortney echoed the Ambassador's comments that
such rhetoric negatively impacted the world's view of Iran and ultimately would undermine Iran's standing in the international community. On this same issue, the General expressed his pleasure with the White House press statement on August 5 responding to the IRGC commander's comments regarding closure of the Strait, agreeing that Iranian closure of the strait would be suicide (i.e., more harmful to Iran's own economic interests). He also commended the U.S. for not escalating the rhetoric but instead putting Iran's comments into proper perspective. Iraq and Iranian Expansionism MUSCAT 00000565 002 OF 003 6. (S/NF) Prior to delving into the nuclear issues, Ali Majid acknowledged that Iranian interference in Iraq prevented achievement of a stable security environment there. He allowed that, at a minimum, Iran indirectly supported Shi'a militia in Iraq. Elaborating on his theme of "Iranian expansionist" ideology, he noted that the Iranian national radio broadcast commenced with the prelude "the voice of the Islamic Republic from Tehran." Focusing on "from Tehran," he astutely raised Omani concerns that such language revealed Iran's true intentions: a "greater Islamic Republic" with Tehran at its center. He further speculated that Iran wanted to give the impression that the Islamic Republic might already encompass "Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and even the Gulf." 7. (S/NF) Ali Majid linked the nuclear issue and the interference in Iraq by speculating that a resolution might entice Iran into ceasing its interference in Iraq. He offered a rhetorical question on whether Iran was serious about challenging the major powers or is it posturing in the media for domestic consumption. He conceded that he truly did not know the answer, but that with Iran's continued attitude on the nuclear issue, the security situation in Iraq would remain unresolved. Citing Oman's preference for a non-military solution, he nevertheless acknowledged that a nuclear-armed Iran as opposed to war with Iran posed "an extremely difficult dilemma for all of us." Playing to Their Domestic Audience 8. (S/NF) Acknowledging Iran's revolutionary zeal, the General attempted to put Iranian public statements in perspective when he described as exaggerations those comments by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmed-I Nejad or other Iranian figures, particularly regarding military capabilities. "Countries that believe they have some specific military weapons advantages usually keep them secret," he averred. He asserted that in the end, all power resided with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 9. (S/NF) Ali Majid portrayed Shi'a ideology as another factor complicating possible military conflict with Iran. Iranian leaders would not balk at sacrificing a quarter of their 60 million citizens in a military conflict. The Shi'a tradition of martyrdom spanned 14 centuries. The annual self-flagellation of Shi'a over 1,400 years served as an example of this martyr psychology. Beyond its Shi'a ideology, pride in its Persian national identity compelled Iran to demand international recognition and respect. 10. (S/NF) Returning back to comments about GCC countries, General Ali singled out Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar as three Gulf countries that probably would want the U.S. to strike Iran. However, he urged the U.S. to determine whether such voices were speaking on the basis of logic or emotion. He likened private entreaties of these countries to the U.S. for military action on Iran to the Iraqi opposition in exile providing the U.S. false information on Iraq that led to the invasion of Iraq. At the beginning of the meeting, Ali Majid had noted that, in contrast to Oman, other GCC members did not always speak with candor or clarity, leaving Oman to question the real motivations or intentions of its GCC brethren. 11. (S/NF) Punctuating his comments about Iran's irrationality, Ali Majid pointed to Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's recent comment that "Iran is crazy" not to pay attention to the history of Yugoslavia and Iraq, whose ignoring of U.S. pressure resulted in their collapse. Interestingly, he referred to Qadhafi's transformation from pariah to emerging member of the international community by noting that Qadhafi had once been "our enemy." Oman in a "Strategic Relationship" with the U.S. 12. (S) Shifting from Iran, Ali Majid underscored Oman's "strategic relationship" with the U.S. and highlighted Oman's cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism issues. He described Oman's zero tolerance for extremism and refusal to negotiate with terrorists as a policy established at least since 1970 (the year of the Sultan's assumed power). Oman has been and continues to prepare itself to confront terrorism, he said, as it is not exempt from the plotting of terrorists. While Oman is "encircled by problems" -- specifically mentioning Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan -- MUSCAT 00000565 003 OF 003 Oman remains vigilant in preventing such problems from reaching the Sultanate. On the topic of Oman's partnership with the U.S., he harkened back to when the Soviets had sought a warm water port during the time of their invasion of Afghanistan and were rebuffed by Muscat as an example of how "Oman has stood at the side of the U.S." He also highlighted the irony that now the world faced "not the Soviets but the Taliban." He quickly followed this by noting that the U.S. would be wise to support talks with moderate members of the Taliban, which Oman encouraged as a way toward achieving security in Afghanistan. 13. (S/NF) Participants in the meeting included VADM Gortney, the Ambassador, the admiral's executive officer, Embassy Muscat's OMC Chief, and GRPO (notetaker). Sayyid Munthir bin Majid al-Sa'id, head of the Royal Office Liaison and Coordination Service participated as notetaker and translator for General Ali. Comment 14. (S/NF) In light of recent, more conciliatory statements by Minister Responsible for foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 'Alawi, Ali Majid's blunt assessment of Iranian intentions comes as refreshing reassurance of the official Omani position on Iran. While careful to flag Oman's longstanding preference for a non-military solution to the Iran question and, less directly, Oman's inability to actively confront Iranian obstinacy, the Sultanate nevertheless maintains a clear-eyed view of Iran, its increasingly threatening behavior and the potential repercussions for the region. His comments regarding attitudes and perceptions of fellow GCC members were startling as they would appear to confirm oft stated views of GCC counterparts of Oman as the sometimes "odd man out" in the GCC. Ali Majid's comments suggest that while not entirely comfortable with this, the Omanis acknowledge it. Ali Majid, as the Sultan's top security official and advisor, is known for taking a more hard-line view of matters relating to regional security. However, given his closeness to the Sultan and his status as a member of the inner-most circle of the Sultan's confidants, such views to a senior U.S. officercan be assumed to accord with those of Qaboos. VZCZCXYZ0000OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHMS #0071/01 0331443ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 021443Z FEB 10FM AMEMBASSY MUSCATTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1190INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATERUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATEGULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVERHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENTRHMFISS/COMUSAFCENT SHAW AFB SCC O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000071 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/02 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IR MU
SUBJECT: OMANI GOVERNMENT REACTS STRONGLY TO SUGGESTION OF PATRIOT OFFER CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Schmierer, Ambassador, Department of State, Embassy Muscat; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) 1. (C) Summary: A recent New York Time's (NYT) article describing Patriot missile deployment to countries in the Gulf in order to counter Iran, assuage Israel, and reassure our Gulf partners has been disquieting to the Omani Government. There has never been an official USG offer of Patriots to Oman, due in large part to the GoO's rejection of any undertaking that might include or would imply the presence of Patriot missiles here. Oman's close partnership with the USG, particularly through the Base Access Agreement (BAA), is contingent on maintaining an extremely low profile and continuing the Sultanate's foreign policy objective of carefully balancing public perception of its relationships with the U.S. and Iran. Press of this sort, however unintended, makes it extremely difficult for Oman to maintain that balance. End Summary. Press Articles on Missile Defense in the Gulf 2. (U) A NYT article appeared on January 30 titled "U.S. Speeding Up Missile Defenses in Persian Gulf," which quoted General Petraeus as saying that Patriot missile batteries would be located in four gulf countries, and noted that Saudi Arabia already has Patriots. An unnamed military official named the countries as Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait. The version of this article syndicated by the NYT news service includes the sentence "Oman, which has always been sensitive about perceptions that it is doing U.S. bidding, has also been approached, but there is no deployment of Patriots there, according to U.S. officials." (Note: That sentence does not/not appear in the version currently available via the NYT website, and it is unclear to post if it appeared in the print edition on January 31; the syndicated version of the article is otherwise not substantially different from the NYT original. End Note). The item was picked up by regional press on January 31, quoting the NYT article and specifically noting that "Oman has declined the offer." On February 2, the private English daily "Times of Oman" carried a front page article titled "Missile Shield: Oman denies receiving any offer from US." In it, Sayyid Badr al Busaidi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), is quoted as saying, "the Sultanate's position on such matters is firm and that it does not ... enter into alliances or axis (sic) against any state." He stressed that Oman "does not allow its territory to be used to carry out any military operations against any country in the region." Oman is not Interested3. (C) The Embassy has no record of a formal offer of Patriot missiles made to Oman by the USG. However, a number of discussions have occurred in which USG intent was to gauge Omani interest in collective missile defense capability. Oman has consistently shown a lack of interest and has politely declined to engage in substantive discussions on "shared early warning" systems, "integrated air defense," or "collective defense." (Note: This is likely due to its assessment that Iran does not pose an imminent threat, its desire to not needlessly antagonize Iran, and its distrust of fellow GCC members, making it unwilling to share data within that group. End Note.) Further, in official correspondence, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) rejected an offer for a "Missile and Air Defence Working Group" on February 6, 2009; rejected further offers for an "Air and Missile Defense Shared Early Warning (SEW) System" on March 30, 2009, citing Oman's "unwillingness to commit itself to a SEW"; and on July 22, 2009 again rejected any participation in the "Air Defense Missiles Advanced Warning System" project. Direct Omani Reaction 4. (C) The Omani Royal Office made contact with the Embassy on February 2 to express strong concern about the article and its repercussions, as that office had just received a pointed inquiry from the Sultan on this matter. In a follow-up discussion embassy officer provided the history of discussions on the issue, of which the Royal Office was previously unaware, due to what was described as a "lack of lateral coordination within the GoO." 5. (C) Comment: The strength of Oman's immediate reaction, and the level at which it transpired, is reflective of the tremendous seriousness with which this matter is viewed by the GoO. It is likely that one of the goals of Badr's media statement was to protect the U.S./Omani relationship, as any belief that the U.S. would attempt to utilize Omani territory in this way could potentially cause a public backlash that would jeopardize other aspects of our relationship. The deployment of Patriots to Oman, especially with the goal of countering the Iran threat, would run completely counter to Oman's publicly-stated foreign-policy objectives. Although they do not find the threat imminent, Iran is Oman's number one strategic threat; however, the GoO fundamentally believes the threat can be mitigated through careful management of the relationship. Therefore, the GoO works very deliberately to create a public perception of balance in its relationships with the U.S. and Iran. Oman's security strategy of keeping a low public profile in general has been threatened by the attention brought by the NYT article, and the GoO is working to manage the message for the public. End Comment. Schmierer.
